With the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), the cybersecurity of individual products comes into focus. Manufacturers must assess the risks of each affected product. Based on this assessment, they derive protective measures and document their decisions. Risk assessment therefore forms the central basis for determining the product-specific applicability of the essential cybersecurity requirements, deriving appropriate measures, and demonstrating their implementation as part of the technical documentation and conformity assessment.
In our webinar on the Cyber Resilience Act, our colleague Phillip Ansorge explained what matters when it comes to implementation. One key takeaway: Manufacturers do not have to start from scratch to achieve CRA compliance. The CRA does not prescribe a specific risk assessment methodology. Companies can use existing approaches but must adapt them to the specific product, its context of use, and the potential consequences for users.

The Cyber Resilience Act Puts the Product at the Center
Many companies already manage risks, vulnerabilities, and security incidents through established processes. However, these processes often focus on the organization itself. The Cyber Resilience Act shifts the focus to products with digital elements. Its scope also extends far beyond traditional IT products. Hardware with integrated software, standalone software products, and certain remote data processing solutions may also fall within its scope.
For manufacturers, CRA implementation therefore starts with two questions: Which products fall within the scope, and how are their boundaries defined? Only a clearly defined product scope shows which components, services, and dependencies need to be assessed. Importers and distributors also have obligations. However, responsibility for the actual risk assessment of the product generally lies with the manufacturer.
Cyber Resilience Act: Start by Defining the Product Scope
A robust risk assessment for the Cyber Resilience Act requires a precise understanding of the product and its context of use. Manufacturers should therefore begin by defining what is part of the product and which elements are relevant to its secure use.
This includes, among other things:
- Hardware, software, and firmware
- External libraries and other dependencies
- Required cloud services
- Data that is processed, stored, or transmitted
- User groups and operating environments
- Functions that require protection and connected systems
- Intended product lifetime and support periods
Remote data processing deserves particular attention. A remote data processing solution forms part of the product if the software used for this purpose was developed by the manufacturer or under the manufacturer's responsibility and if the product would not be able to perform one of its functions without that processing. Connected services, interfaces, and technical dependencies must therefore each be examined to determine whether they are part of the product, an integrated component, or merely an external dependency.
For a robust product analysis, product development, information security, and compliance teams need to combine their knowledge. Only by working together can they comprehensively identify components, the context of use, vulnerabilities, and dependencies, and gather the required regulatory evidence.
Assessing Product Risks from the User's Perspective
Traditional risk assessments often focus on the organization itself. They assess potential financial losses, business interruptions, or reputational damage.
Under the CRA, by contrast, the focus is on the cybersecurity of the product, its specific context of use, and the potential impact of a security incident. Particular consideration must be given to the consequences for users, data, functions, connected systems, and other assets requiring protection. Relevant considerations include how the product is actually used, which data and functions need to be protected, and which forms of misuse are reasonably foreseeable. How manufacturers assess risks also depends on the operating environment and the intended product lifetime.
An example illustrates the difference: If a connected washing machine loses only its connection to the smartphone app as a result of an attack, the consequences for the user may remain limited, provided the appliance can still be operated directly. If, however, the attack affects essential product functions or connected systems, the risk increases, as does the level of protection required.
Manufacturers should therefore derive the necessary measures from the actual product risk and document their decisions clearly. The assessment must be technically sound and appropriate for the specific product and its intended use.
From Risk Assessment to Cyber Resilience Act Implementation
For the implementation of the Cyber Resilience Act, risk assessment is not a downstream documentation task. It provides the technical basis for key decisions:
- Which cybersecurity requirements are relevant to the product?
- Which attack scenarios and vulnerabilities need to be considered?
- What consequences could arise for users?
- What level of security is appropriate?
- Which protective measures must the manufacturer implement?
- How can the implementation of these measures be demonstrated as part of the conformity assessment?
The risk assessment therefore shows how the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I apply to the specific product. It forms the basis both for the product's security characteristics and for the processes used to handle vulnerabilities. Where individual requirements are not applicable, the manufacturer must provide a comprehensible justification in the technical documentation.
In practice, the process can be structured into five steps:
1. Identify the product and its context of use:
Manufacturers define the scope and analyze components, functions, data, user groups, and operating environments.
2. Identify attack scenarios and vulnerabilities:
They examine which threats the product may be exposed to and which technical or organizational vulnerabilities are relevant.
3. Assess risks:
They assess, in particular, the technical exploitability and plausibility of the scenarios as well as their potential impact on the product, its users, data, functions, and connected systems. Existing qualitative or quantitative assessment methods can be used for this purpose.
4. Determine the appropriate security level and protective measures:
On this basis, they define suitable protective measures. These may include secure default settings, protection against unauthorized access, secure updates, and effective vulnerability management.
5. Document and update the results:
The decisions are recorded in the technical documentation and inform the conformity assessment.. At the same time, they provide a basis for the gap analysis and the roadmap for CRA implementation.
Risk Assessment Accompanies the Product Lifecycle
Under the Cyber Resilience Act, the assessment does not end when the product is launched. New vulnerabilities, changes to components, additional functions, or new attack scenarios may require an update. Risk assessment for the Cyber Resilience Act therefore accompanies the product throughout its entire lifecycle. It must be maintained during the support period and updated when circumstances require it. An update may be necessary in particular when new vulnerabilities emerge, significant product changes are made, components change, new insights into attack scenarios become available, or the intended context of use changes. In addition, a periodic risk-based review is recommended.
This requires clear responsibilities and robust processes. Vulnerabilities must be linked to specific products and versions. Responsibilities for updates, reporting, and changes to documentation should also be clearly defined.
Include Open Source Dependencies
Free and open-source software provided outside the course of a commercial activity generally does not fall under the CRA as a manufacturer's product. However, the CRA establishes a separate, graduated set of obligations for certain open-source software stewards. If a manufacturer integrates open-source components into a commercial product, the manufacturer remains responsible for the cybersecurity of the overall product and must exercise due diligence when selecting and integrating these components.
Manufacturers therefore need to know which components and versions they use. They should also clarify who maintains these components, how promptly security updates become available, and what impact the discontinuation of an open-source project could have on their own product. In the event of a security issue, simply referring to the community is not sufficient.
As a result, open-source governance, supply chain security, and Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) are becoming increasingly important. The CRA requires manufacturers to identify and document the components of the product and, for this purpose, to create an SBOM in a commonly used, machine-readable format covering at least the product's top-level dependencies.
Extend Existing Processes with a Product-Specific Perspective
Manufacturers can further develop existing risk management methods as well as security incident and information security processes for the CRA risk assessment. Existing management systems and risk processes, for example those based on ISO/IEC 27001 or BSI IT-Grundschutz, can provide roles, governance structures, and methodological foundations. For the Cyber Resilience Act, however, they must be supplemented by a product-specific perspective covering aspects such as product architecture, components, versions, context of use, threat scenarios, and vulnerability handling.
These management systems and processes do not replace a product-specific risk assessment. Manufacturers should therefore examine whether their existing processes represent risks at product and version level. It is equally important that vulnerabilities, updates, reports, and evidence can be clearly assigned to specific products.
By specifically extending existing processes, companies can avoid unnecessary duplicate structures. This enables information security, product development, and compliance teams to work from a common foundation.
Start with the Scope Now
The results of the risk assessment feed into technical implementation, documentation, and conformity assessment. The more precisely manufacturers understand their product, its context of use, and its dependencies, the more effectively they can assess risks and determine appropriate measures.
Therefore, start with a clearly defined scope. Identify affected products at an early stage, define their boundaries, and record relevant components, external services, and technical dependencies. Also clarify where product data is processed, which support periods apply, and who is responsible internally.
In a Scope Workshop, you define the boundaries of the affected products and identify relevant components, services, and dependencies. On this basis, you can identify gaps and prioritize the next steps for technical implementation, vulnerability management, and conformity assessment.
Would you like to implement the Cyber Resilience Act in a structured manner and assess the risks of your products in a targeted way? Contact us.
About the Expert: Phillip Ansorge
Phillip Ansorge is a Managing Security Consultant at usd AG. He supports manufacturers in the practical implementation of the Cyber Resilience Act and other regulatory requirements for product and operational security across complex product environments and cross organizational structures. His focus is on clear decision making processes, robust reporting processes, and traceable security decisions.




